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Inter-firm inventor movements and the optimal  
structure of co-inventor networks 
 
Gergő Tóth – Balázs Lengyel 
Abstract  
 
There is a growing consensus that high impact innovation requires diverse knowledge access 
and cohesive groupwork at the same time; however, the role of social and collaboration 
networks in this phenomenon is still underexplored. In this paper we construct a weighted 
and time-decayed co-inventor network from all IT-related patents in the harmonized OECD 
PATSTAT 1977-2013 database. We look at the future impact of firm innovation and apply an 
inventor mobility framework for the 1990-2000 period to isolate the effect of inventor 
characteristics from the characteristics of the collaboration network in the firm. Our results 
imply that highest impact innovations are produced if the firm hires brokers who will work in 
cohesive networks in the firm. We find evidence that the small world property of networks 
within the firm exaggerates the effect of incoming brokers and high-impact inventors. 
 
JEL: C31, J69, O31 
 
Keywords: co-inventor network, network constraint, small world network, patent 
citations, difference-in-differences, predicted margins 
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Feltalálók cégek közötti mobilitása  
és optimális együttműködési hálózata 
 
Tóth Gergő – Lengyel Balázs  
 
Összefoglaló 
 
Egyre nagyobb az egyetértés azt illetően, hogy a jelentős innovációk születéséhez egyszerre 
szükséges a diverz tudáshoz való hozzáférés és a kohézív csoportokban való részvétel. Az 
együttműködési hálózatok szerepe a jelenségben azonban kevésbé feltárt. Tanulmányunkban 
az OECD PATSTAT adatbázisának 1977-2013 közötti IT-tevékenységekhez kapcsolódó 
szabadalmai alapján konstruálunk súlyozott és időben késleltetett feltalálói hálózatokat. Az 
1990-2010 közötti feltalálói mobilitási hálózat segítségével elkülönítjük a feltalálók egyéni és 
kollaborációs hálózati jellemzőinek befolyását a cégek jövőbeli innovációira. Vizsgálatunk 
alapján a legnagyobb hatású innovációk születéséhez olyan brókerek alkalmazására van 
szükség, akik képesek kohézív kapcsolatrendszerben dolgozni a cégen belül. Eredményeink 
rámutattak, hogy a vállalaton belüli hálózatok kisvilág-tulajdonsága felnagyítja az újonnan 
alkalmazott feltalálók hatását.   
JEL: C31, J69, O31 
 
Tárgyszavak: együttműködési hálózat, kisvilághálózat, szabadalmi hivatkozások, 
különbségek-különbsége módszere  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Collaboration networks are crucial in understanding innovative success, in which the 
structure of the network and the position of the firm or the inventor determines the variety of 
knowledge access and therefore are considered as major underlying factors for innovation 
(Borgatti and Cross 2003, Capaldo 2007, Ibarra 1993, Inkpen and Tsang 2005, Schilling and 
Phelps 2007, Singh 2005, Sorenson et al. 2006, Sparrowe et al 2001, Uzzi 1997). The 
structural hole hypothesis is one of the most reflected propositions in this regard claiming 
that those firms or individuals –often called brokers– produce more radical innovations 
whose contacts represent non-redundant parts of the network (Burt 2004, Granovetter 1973). 
However, there is no clear evidence on the above theory because innovation can be produced 
in a cohesive network and also in a network with structural holes depending on the role of 
social capital in the process of innovation (Burt 1987). Accordingly, the related empirical 
evidence is divided in terms of the effect of network constraint. On the one hand, the 
innovation output of the firm is found to depend more on the number of connections but 
structural holes were found to have a negative effect (Ahuja 2000, de Vaan et al. 2015). On 
the other hand, Fleming et al. (2007) found a positive effect of brokering on innovation 
output of individuals. This still standing puzzle provides opportunities for new questions. 
In a more recent discussion, weak ties are confronted with strong ties stressing a 
diversity-bandwidth trade-off regarding information diffusion in networks (Aral and van 
Alstyne 2011). In this argument, cohesive networks are claimed to channel complex 
information if paired with high bandwidth of strong ties as opposed to the classic proposition 
of Granovetter (1973) where diverse and therefore valuable information can be collected 
through weak ties that link loosely connected circles in the network. Notwithstanding the 
high plausibility of the diversity-bandwidth trade-off theory, very few papers provided 
empirical evidence for the statements. Besides Aral and van Alstyne (2011), Bruggeman 
(2016) finds strong evidence supporting the diversity-bandwidth above statement by using 
patent citation networks. Further, Aral (2016) claims that new identification strategies and in 
particular experimental and quasi-experimental approaches are needed to understand the 
endogenous relation between social structure and nodal outcomes. In this paper, we take a 
quasi-experimental approach by taking the case of inter-firm mobility of inventors and by 
investigating how the network characteristics of mobile inventors and the characteristics of 
the networks in the firm influence the future impact of the innovation in the firm. 
We wish to contribute to the literature by translating the above discussion into two 
innovation management questions. First, shall the firm hire the broker inventor or the one 
who has worked in cohesive environments before? The broker might have access to more 
diverse knowledge while the inventor with cohesive network might have a deeper 
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understanding of specific complex knowledge; and therefore, the firm may face a situation 
similar to the diversity-bandwidth trade-off. We propose that firms shall choose those 
inventors who are brokers but only to a certain degree so that they have a medium-diverse or 
medium-cohesive network. Second, what structure of the network in the receiving firm 
intensifies the impact of the incoming inventor? New inventors bring new knowledge to the 
firm that can be exploited more effectively in cohesive groups. In sum, the optimal firm-level 
outcome can be reached when hiring brokers with some experience in working with cohesive 
groups and make them work in a tightly knit network. This case the firm can optimize the 
innovation output by combining diverse knowledge access with complex understanding. 
To answer the above questions and provide evidence for the argument, we create a 
weighted co-inventor network from all IT-related patents in the harmonized OECD PATSTAT 
1977-2013 database by projecting inventor co-occurrence in patents using hyperbolic 
weighting. We introduce an exponential time decay to deflate tie strength and calculate 
network constraint (Burt, 2004) for every inventor and every year, and the small-worldliness 
indicator for collaboration networks in every firm and every year (Uzzi and Spiro, 2005). 
Next, we apply an inter-firm inventor mobility framework for the period 1990-2000, and 
using a difference-in-differences approach to argue for causal relation between inventor 
mobility and innovation output. Finally, we look at the cumulated number of citations of the 
patents at the hiring firm using linear regression models and various values of time-lags and 
isolate the effect of inventor characteristics from characteristics of networks in firms and 
investigate how the structure of collaboration network within the firm influences the effect of 
incoming inventors.Normal paragraph, 0.25 inch indent.  
2. LITERATURE AND HYPOTHESES 
The mobility of inventors has long been considered a major source of knowledge flow across 
inventing firms because firms benefit from the tacit or embodied knowledge of incoming 
inventors (Almeida and Kogut 1999, Arrow 1962, Levin et al. 1987, Palomeras and Melero 
2010, Zucker et al. 2002). These mobile inventors are not homogenous and have larger 
effects on firm-level outcomes if they bring new technological expertise to the receiving firm 
(Rosenkopf and Almeida 2003, Song et al. 2003). Besides embodied knowledge and skills, 
incoming inventors can also establish new inter-firm ties by maintaining interaction with 
previous colleagues at distinct companies (Agrawal et al. 2006, Breschi and Lissoni 2005, 
2009). These social and professional connections can provide the hiring firm with additional 
access to external knowledge (Powell et al. 1996) and are especially important when the 
research group has to understand complex knowledge (Reagans and McEvily 2003, Sorenson 
et al. 2006). However, very little is known about the role of network characteristics of 
incoming inventors in firm-level innovation. In this paper, we aim to open up this question 
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and also aim to understand how collaboration networks within the receiving firm amplify the 
effect of incoming inventors. 
Mobile inventors are heterogeneous in terms of their network structure and thus provide 
the firm with access to information of various scale and scope. For example, Kemeny et al. 
(2016) showed that the number of connections of incoming managers explains the variations 
in major firm level outcomes – such as profit – because high degree managers channel more 
external information into the firm than low degree managers. However, one might expect 
that the type of ties and the structure of the network can tell us more about information 
access than the mere number of connections. As it was put forward by Granovetter (1973) in 
one of the most influential ideas in social science, weak ties provide access to diverse 
information by linking loosely connected groups (Burt 1992). Consequently, individuals 
bridging structural holes between communities – who are often called brokers – can combine 
larger variety of information (Burt 2000) and can also control the information flow, which 
arguably provides additional gains (Newman 2005). Consequently, brokers are frequently 
associated with better innovation outputs (Burt 2004) than those with cohesive networks 
where the access to diverse knowledge is less likely.  
However, trust and cohesion between connected individuals are very important for 
learning as well and one might consider the weak ties argument with limitations (Coleman 
1988, Putnam 1995). Burt (2000, at p. 11.) also states that “[…] bridges through structural 
holes are the source of the ideas of the new inventions but trustful communication due highly 
connected individuals can be as much as important […]”. In a recent discussion, weak ties are 
confronted with strong ties stressing a diversity-bandwidth trade-off regarding information 
diffusion in networks (Aral and Van Alstyne 2011). It is claimed in this argument that 
complex information is easier to access in cohesive or constrained networks and through 
strong ties due to the high level of trust and bandwidth of communication between alters 
(Aral 2016). Therefore, the individual is expected to collect complex information from strong 
and cohesive contacts in rapidly changing environments and shallow but diverse information 
content from weak ties. 
One might anticipate from the above discussion that the combination of weak and strong 
ties is desirable for firm-level innovation outcomes. For example, Fleming et al. (2007) 
investigate the new combinations of patent subclasses in the assignments and the re-use of 
these combinations in order to model generative creativity on the basis of inventor 
collaborations. They find that broker inventors are more likely to create new combinations in 
general. However, they also demonstrate that new combinations may arise from cohesive 
networks as well if these environments are connected to two or more assignees. Yet, an 
inventor mobility framework can add to the understanding how network cohesion and 
brokerage of inventors influence firm level innovation because we can disentangle the 
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individual effects of incoming inventors from the effects of collaboration networks within the 
firm. 
With all the above discussion in mind, we wish to contribute to the literature in two ways. 
First, we pick one from three alternative hypotheses regarding the relation between the 
network structure of the incoming inventors and the innovation performance of the firm. The 
“Cohesion hypothesis” would suggest that inventors with cohesive network are more 
influential than inventors with diverse networks because they might have developed a deep 
understanding of complex knowledge working in cohesive groups previously (Obstfeld 2005). 
In contrast, the “Structural hole hypothesis” would imply that broker inventors are more 
influential for the firm than non-brokers because they have access to diverse knowledge (Burt 
2004). Instead of these two traditional approaches, we propose the “Optimal cohesion 
hypothesis” and argue that inventors with medium value of network cohesion have the 
greatest influence on the firm not the ones with extremely cohesive or extremely diverse 
networks. This is a reasonable expectation because too little cohesion in the network might 
harm the efficiency of knowledge transfer and trust-based relationships (Uzzi 1997), while 
too much cohesion threatens the innovation effort with isolation from idea flows and with 
lack of economies of scope (Hansen 1999). Instead, inventors with optimal networks should 
have access to diverse information by brokering the network and should be able to work in 
cohesive groups as well to exploit complex knowledge (Aral 2016, Fleming et al. 2007). 
Hypothesis 1: The innovation performance of those firms that hire new inventors with 
medium value of network cohesion is higher than those firms that hire inventors with very 
diverse or very cohesive networks. 
Because networked inventors are more productive and therefore firms might be more 
motivated in hiring them away (Nakajima et al. 2010), productive inventors are likely to 
increase their networks (Lee 2010) and in turn, their mobility further increase their 
productivity because they learn from job switching (Hoisl 2009). This is an important 
endogenous relation between productivity and collaboration networks, and we argue that the 
inventor mobility framework allows us to go after this endogenous change. The collaboration 
network of the mobile inventor is further generated as he/she moves from one firm to 
another (Casper 2007), thus we can look at how the change in network characteristics 
influences firm-level innovation outcomes. We posit that the knowledge the new inventor 
brings into the firm is easier to exploit in cohesive groups than in loosely knit networks. 
Therefore, those firms are relatively more likely to produce high impact innovation that make 
new inventors work in groups and consequently, the network of the mobile inventors 
becomes more cohesive in these situations. 
Hypothesis 2: The innovation performance of those firms is higher where the network of 
mobile inventors become more cohesive than before the mobility event. 
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Hypotheses 1 can be verified by a reversed U-shape association between network 
cohesion of the incoming inventors and the firm-level innovation performance, whereas the 
shift of this optimal value towards cohesion would support Hypothesis 2. This perspective 
accords well with Uzzi and Spiro (2005) who found similar correspondence between the 
success of Broadway musicals and the small-worldliness of artist collaboration networks, 
which indicates cohesive groups brokered by few individuals. We provide new evidence of an 
optimal network structure at the individual level, which can be really useful in innovation 
management decisions because individual characteristics are easier to detect than to optimize 
networks in groups. 
In the last step, we further investigate how collaboration networks within the firm 
influence the effect of new inventors. Based on the diversity-bandwidth literature (Aral 2016, 
Aral and van Alstyne 2011) and the findings of Fleming et al. (2007), we expect that cohesive 
networks within the firm intermediate the novel diversity gained by new broker inventors 
better than loose networks do. We propose that small-world properties of the network shall 
be investigated to better understand this problem. However, instead of applying the small-
worldliness indicator (Uzzi and Spiro, 2005), we focus on two key properties that describe 
small world networks and analyze the interaction term between the characteristics of new 
inventors and the characteristics of the intra-firm networks (Watts and Strogatz, 1998). 
Hypothesis 3: The effect of mobile brokers is further enhanced by high levels of triadic 
closure and low levels of average path length of the inventor collaboration network within the 
firm. 
3. MATERIALS AND METHODS 
3.1 DATA 
We downloaded the OECD Patent Database 1977-2013 directly from the OECD FTP servers in 
February 2015 and used data of patents filed by the European Patent Office (EPO). The full 
dataset contains three sources of data. (1) OECD REGPAT database version February 2015 
covers patent documents filed by the EPO (derived from PATSTAT 2014 autumn edition). 
There are unique identifiers for patents, applicants, and inventors in the data that can be 
matched with other sources in the database. Furthermore, technological classes of the 
patents as well as the year of application are present in the table. The EPO data contains 
2,750,644 patent documents authored by 594,461 inventors. (2) OECD HAN (Harmonized 
Applicant Names) database version February 2015 contains the cleaned and matched names 
of patent applicants. Although OECD statisticians warned us that the data might encounter 
mismatches and errors; this is the best freely available and ready to use dataset that enable 
researchers to trace patenting firms.  There are 2,837,597 unique applicants identified in the 
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HAN database. (3) OECD Citations database version February 2015 contains those EPO, PCT 
or USPTO patents that cite the EPO patents we analyze. The data is derived from EPO’s 
PATSTAT database, autumn 2014.  There are 99,449,770 unique citations in the data. 
These datasets have been merged by the patent identifiers. Then, we narrowed down the 
database to the G06 IPC1 code that refers to “Computing, calculating and counting”. This 
technological class suits our research question (Fleming et al. 2007), because programming is 
a highly innovative process in which fixed costs are relatively low and therefore learning 
through mobility and social networks might play a more important role than in other 
technological areas. 
Table 1  
Number of observations in the data 
Data Observations 
Years 36 
Countries 68 
Firms 28,028 
Treated firms 3,370 
Mobile inventors 6,396 
Mobility 13,519 
 
We exclude those firms that receive more than one new inventor in any of the years the 
analysis covers because we aim to interpret the effect of nodal characteristics of moving 
inventors and cannot estimate this effect if more than one inventor arrives to the firm. The 
remaining dataset contains 28,028 firms located in 68 countries in the period between 1977 
and 2013 (Table 1), out of which 3,370 firms that hired exactly one new inventor per year. 
The number of those inventors who move across firms is 6,396 and there are 13,519 
movements in total. Supporting Information 1 contains descriptive figures about the number 
of inventors, the number of firms, the volume of inventor mobility and the list of countries. 
3.2 NETWORK CREATION AND DETECTION OF INTER-FIRM MOVEMENTS 
The co-inventor network is constructed from an inventor-patent co-occurrence table and 
inventors i and j are connected if they co-author a patent together. If the patent is co-
authored by more than two inventors, the network between them will be a fully connected 
clique by default, which may lead to biased results (Uzzi and Spiro 2005). Therefore, we 
                                                        
1 The International Patent Classification (IPC) provides for a “hierarchical system of language independent 
symbols for the classification of patents and utility models according to the different areas of technology to 
which they pertain”. 
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apply the hyperbolic method suggested by Newman (2001) to project the co-occurrence 
matrix to one-mode ties. Formally, 
 
,         (1) 
 
where  and are 1 if inventor i and inventor j co-author patent k in year u and zero 
otherwise and nk is the number of inventors authoring patent k. Because inventors i and j 
might co-author more than one patent in year u, we maximize  at 1. Further, we 
assume that the strength of the tie weakens over time (Burt 2000) and thus we apply an 
exponential time decay function between the year of patent publication u and year t. The 
exponent of time decay is  and the parameter is set to be equal with 0.1 as it was suggested 
by Jin et al. (2001). In the last step, we set wij,t to  in case of a new collaboration 
between i and j and if . 
The inter-firm movement of inventors is defined as follows. An inventor moves from 
company A to company B if at least one patent application authored or co-authored by 
inventor i has been submitted by company A prior to an application authored or co-authored 
by inventor i has been submitted by company B. We detect the movement from A to B at the 
year when the patent application is submitted by B.2 
The time dimension needs further special care because the data only contains the year of 
application and the year when the patent was filed, which might be problematic because 
collaboration typically happens before the application is submitted. In order to remedy this 
problem, we assume that the edge between inventors i and j is created two years prior the 
year of patent application because there is substantial time needed to work together before 
the patent application can be submitted. This approach is not without limitations, and might 
cause further problems that we have to tackle. 
The first problem is that we set wij,t equal to  two years before the patent 
application and let the weight decay over these two years. One might think that collaboration 
remains intensive over these years and therefore tie weights should be diminished after the 
patent application only. Fortunately, this limitation does not cause serious problem in our 
analysis. In order to check whether the results depend on the procedure of tie-creation, we 
applied two further alternative ways to define the weight of co-inventor ties. First, we created 
ties with simple co-occurrence projection and did not introduce time decay. This way, the 
                                                        
2 We do not consider the date of the application submitted by company A. 
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weight of each co-inventor tie at every point in time was 1. Second, ties made of simple co-
occurrence projection were weighted by the exponential time decay introduced in the main 
text. This case, the weight of each tie was 1 in the year when the tie was established but the 
weight then decreased over time. 
Since these procedures did not change our results, we chose not to report them and stick 
to the weight defined in Equation 1 that we think represents the value of ties created long in 
the past better than any of the other two tie weighting alternatives.  
The second problem is the detection of mobility and the simultaneous change of nodal 
characteristics of mobile inventors versus the structure of collaboration networks within the 
firm. Because we establish the co-inventor ties two years prior to the application, the network 
characteristics of the mobile inventor i at time u is dependent on the projects he/she is 
involved in at company B. We think that this problem offers some interesting insights, and 
therefore will come back to it in detail in Sections 3.3 and 4.2. 
3.3 ESTIMATION STRATEGY 
Our focus on inventor mobility as events that influence firm-level outcomes allow us to take a 
quasi-experimental approach (Mayer and Davis 1999), in which the firm is treated if it hires a 
new inventor. A major problem is that unlike in controlled experiments, where the 
assignment into treated and control groups is random, in quasi-experiments the assignment 
into treated and control groups is not random. In our case, this means that inventors may be 
motivated to move from less productive to more productive firms because more productive 
firms promise better career potentials and innovation quality. Thus, those firms are more 
likely to get assorted to the treated group that have performed better before the event of the 
treatment, which can lead to biased estimates. To overcome this selection bias, we have to 
prove the causal relation between hiring a new inventor and the impact of innovation. 
To control for the endogeneity issue, we apply a difference-in-differences (diff-in-diff) 
approach, which is suitable when the independent variable is available in the data before and 
after the specific action. In the diff-in-diff approach, we first estimate the effect of the new 
inventor on the recipient firm by comparing the innovation outcome before and after the 
treatment and also compare the outcome of the treated firms with the outcome of the non-
treated firms.  This comparison identifies the expected values of the average change and is 
formulated by: 
 
      (2) 
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where the first term refers to the differences in outcomes before and after the treatment 
for the treated group, which may be biased if there are time trends, and the second term uses 
the differences in outcomes for the control group to eliminate this bias. 
The advantage of the diff-in-diff method is that it can avoid many of the emerging 
endogeneity problems while comparing heterogeneous individuals (Meyer 1995). The main 
limitation is called the parallel trend assumption, according to which the accomplishment of 
the control group should reflect what would happen to the treated group with the lack of the 
treatment. This assumption cannot be directly tested because we want to compare two world 
states of one firm, but this is obviously counterfactual, one cannot observe the evolution of 
the treatment group absent the treatment.  Further, it is often very difficult to check the 
suppositions that are made about the unobservable entities and it is possible that despite 
significant treatment effects, the bias may be too large and consequently lead to wrong 
estimates.3 
In the remainder of the analysis, we run linear regression models to measure the effect of 
inventor and firm-level characteristics on firm-level innovation outcomes. The first 
specification is 
 
,    (3) 
 
where  is the innovation outcome of receiving firm B at time t+v and v is the applied 
time lag,  denotes network characteristics of the mobile inventor i  before the 
movement,  stands for the network structure variables of inventor collaboration within 
receiving firm B at the year of the treatment,  is the collection of control variables of 
inventor i and the sending and receiving firms,  equals 1 if firm B receives exactly 1 new 
inventor at time t and zero otherwise and denotes year fixed effects. 
With the introduction of  and  into Equation 3, we first compare the outcome of 
treated firms at time t+v to the outcome of non-treated firms. Then, the rest of the co-
efficients indicate the comparison within the group of treated firms.  
However, because the effects of mobile inventor on firm-level innovation outcomes 
prevail through collaboration with others in the firm, network characteristics change during 
mobility. In the second specification, we investigate the role of change in nodal 
                                                        
3 Accordingly there is a debate about the validity of the diff-in-diff method. Abadie (2005) discusses group 
comparisons in non-experimental studies, Athey and Imbens (2002) concern the interference in diff-in diff 
because of the linearity assumption, Besley and Case (1994) criticize whether this method really can detangle 
the possibility of endogeneity and Bertland et al. (2002) focus on issues related to the standard error of the 
estimates. 
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characteristics of the mobile inventor during the event of mobility together with nodal 
characteristics after mobility: 
 (4) 
where  denotes nodal characteristics after and  the change during 
mobility. 
In the third step, we estimate the effect of nodal characteristics after the mobility event: 
,    (5) 
Finally, we introduce the interaction term between characteristics of inventor i and the 
network structure of company B: 
 (6) 
where  stands for the interaction between the characteristics of mobile 
inventors and the network structure of the receiving firm. 
In order to check the validity of Hypothesis 1, we predict the marginal effects of by 
keeping all other covariates of Equation 3 fixed. Hypothesis 2 is tested by Equation 4 and by 
calculating the marginal effects of  from Equaiton 5. As a result, we can directly measure 
the change in  as a response to a 1 unit change in  and . Hypothesis 3 is tested 
by analyzing the interaction term in Equation 6. 
 
3.4 VARIABLES 
 
The dependent variable of our analysis is the cumulative change of citations to the patents 
owned by the firm. Although criticized in the literature (Beaudry and Shiffaeurova 2011) the 
number of citations has been frequently used to predict patent quality and market value (Hall 
et al. 2005, Harhoff et al. 1999, Mowery and Ziedonis 2002, Trajtenberg 1990). Further, we 
think that a sufficiently long period of citation accumulation can help us avoid the potentials 
of reversed causality discussed in Section 3.3. 
We characterize the nodal property of the mobile inventor with the well-known network 
constraint measure that was proposed by Burt (1992) to distinguish brokers from non-
brokers. This indicator measures the cohesiveness of the ego-network around a node and is 
formulated by: 
 
,        (7) 
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where  and  is the tie weight defined in Equation 1. Thus,  
quantifies the relative weight that i is connected with directly and  quantifies the 
relative weight that i is connected with indirectly – through another contact q – to contact j. 
The indicator Ci,t takes a high value if the relative weight of q and j pairs is high; and takes a 
low value in the contrary case. Consequently, a high Ci,t denotes a cohesive ego-network of i 
because its’ neighbors are strongly connected, while a low Ci,t denotes that i connects 
otherwise poorly connected parts of the network and therefore i is a broker. 
The network constraint is not totally independent from the number of connections of the 
node (Di,t) because the larger number of connections an inventor has the lower probability 
that these connections will also know each other (Burt, 2004). Indeed, Supporting 
Information 2 demonstrates the strongly negative correlation by illustrating the change of 
these indicators along the different components in the network. In order to evade from the 
potential bias caused by the variance of the number of connections, we control for Di,t  and 
also for the interaction between Ci,t and Di,t.  
Properties of the network at the receiving firm B are captured by the small-worldliness 
that consists of the global clustering coefficient (defined also as triadic closure or transitivity, 
TRB,t) and average path length (APLB,t) in the inventor collaboration network within the firm. 
TRB,t compares the number of closed triangles to the possible number of triangles in the 
network of company B at time t. APLB,t measures the degree of separation between nodes 
averaged over the full collection of node pairs in company B at time t. Social networks are 
typically cliquish and only few steps separate two randomly selected individuals in the 
network. Watts and Strogatz (1998) used these two indicators to describe this phenomenon 
as the small-world property of social networks. Uzzi and Spiro (2005) further formulated the 
small-worldliness into a QB,t = TRB,t / APLB,t ratio and showed that collaborative projects with 
medium QB,t produce the best outcomes because social cohesion is paired with diversity in 
these networks.  
To control for the qualities of the mobile inventor i, as well as the sending firm A, we use 
the total number of patent applications (PATi,t and PATA,t) and the total number of citations 
(CITi,t and CITA,t) the inventors and firms submitted and received until time t. Properties of 
the receiving firm B include the total number of patent applications and citations cumulated 
until time t (PATBt  and CITB,t), the number of patent applications after the treatment and 
within the following 10 years (APP10), the number of treatments received within the 
following 10 years (T10), the number of inventors who author or co-author the patent 
applications that were submitted by the firm in years t-2, t-1 or t (INVB,t) and the density of 
the collaboration network of these inventors (DENSB,t).  
Finally, we found a large drop in the total number of citations in years 2011-2013 that we 
could not explain. Therefore, we decided to exclude these years from the citations dataset, 
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which means that the analysis is restricted to the 1990-2000 period since we look at citation 
growth over ten years and thus the last year of mobility events is 2000.  
Our final sample contains 95,788 observations of firm-year combinations out of which 
8,708 observations concern those firms who receive a new inventor. Descriptive statistics of 
and Pearson correlation between main variables are presented in Table 2.  
Table 2  
Descriptive statistics and correlation between main variables 
 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max 1 2 3 4 5 6 
1 Cit 95,788 0.004 0.060 0 1.681 1 
     2 Dit 95,788 0.020 0.373 0 26 0.519* 1  
    
3 QBt 95,788 0.218 0.390 0 1 
-
0.014* 0.002 1  
   
4 DENSBt 95,788 0.462 0.465 0 3 
-
0.0003 0.004 0.568* 1  
  5 INVBt 95,788 0.021 0.335 0 25 0.199* 0.29* 0.017* 0.014* 1  
 6 TRBt 95,788 0.311 0.454 0 1 0.004 0.022* 0.829* 0.418* 0.050* 1  
7 APLBt 95,788 2.175 9.955 0 518.5 0.023* 0.032* 
-
0.042* 
-
0.066* 0.068* 0.226* 
Note: * p<0.05. 
 
4. RESULTS 
4.1 THE EFFECT OF INVENTOR MOBILITY 
 
The diff-n-diff test provides a clear proof for the causal relationship between inventor 
mobility and average citation growth after 10 years of the treatment (Table 3). The 
estimations illustrate that patents assigned to firms treated in year 1995 receive 8 extra 
citations on average during the next ten years compared to patents assigned to control firms. 
This causal relationship stands for treatments in year 2000 as well, where the treatment 
effect is 2 extra citations. Certainly, the treatment effect might deviate from the average. 
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Table 3  
Diff-in-diff test for inventor mobility and citation growth 
  Treatment 1995 Treatment 2000 
 
Y Std. Error t P Y Std. Error t P 
Before 
        Control (C) 0.369 
   
0.520 
   Treated (T) 1.881 
   
0.783 
   Diff (T-C) 1.512 0.152 9.94 0.000*** 0.263 0.075 3.49 0.000*** 
After 
        Control (C) 1.099 
   
1.143 
   Treated (T) 10.654 
   
3.314 
   Diff (T-C) 9.555 0.215 44.44 0.000*** 2.170 0.181 12.1 0.000*** 
Diff-in-
Diff 8.044 0.263 30.54 0.000*** 1.907 0.196 9.74 0.000*** 
 
Further, one can observe in Figure 1 that treated firms did not differ on average from 
non-treated firms before the treatment. In fact, the number of citations starts to deviate from 
the control group two years after the treatment. Until that point, the trend in the treatment 
and control groups are parallel, and the differences are actually nuanced. This observation is 
very important for our further analysis because we can assume that the observed shift in the 
dependent variable would not occur in the absence of the treatment. This assumption makes 
the bases for the further estimations in which we aim to explain the variance of the deviation 
in the treatment group. 
Figure 1  
Citation growth in treated and control firms 
(A) 
 
(B) 
 
Note: (A) The citations of those firms that receive a new inventor in 1995 start to increase 
sharply in 1997. Treated firms have 8 more citations on average than non-treated firms in 
2005. (B) The citations of those firms that receive a new inventor in 2000 start to increase 
sharply in 2002. Treated firms have 2 more citations on average than non-treated firms in 
2010. 
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Table 4  
The impact of nodal characteristics of mobile inventors 
 
 
Cumulative citations of firms 10 years after the treatment 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
Network 
characteristics of 
the mobile inventor 
Cit-3 -0.743575*** -0.655676**  
 
(0.285) (0.296)  
Cit - Cit-3  0.786228***  
 
 (0.266)  
Cit   1.103024** 
 
  (0.470) 
Cit  squared   -0.864641** 
 
  (0.389) 
Cit × Dit -0.212756*** -0.274054*** -0.326902*** 
 
(0.053) (0.089) (0.095) 
Dit 0.039537** 0.049212** 0.039174* 
 
(0.017) (0.022) (0.021) 
 
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
Quality of the 
mobile inventor 
CITit -0.018494 -0.035142 -0.031034 
 
(0.047) (0.048) (0.048) 
PATit 0.081113*** 0.074478** 0.045779 
 
(0.031) (0.031) (0.031) 
Quality of the 
recipient firm 
CITBt 0.016212*** 0.016216*** 0.016213*** 
 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
PATBt 0.034799*** 0.034799*** 0.034807*** 
 
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Quality of the 
sending firm 
CITAt -0.000139 -0.000141 -0.000146 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
PATAt 0.000366* 0.000368* 0.000379* 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Treatment and 
dynamics 
T 0.223448*** 0.222537*** 0.222810*** 
 
(0.043) (0.043) (0.043) 
T10 0.205008*** 0.204818*** 0.204854*** 
 
(0.059) (0.059) (0.059) 
APP10 0.024600*** 0.024602*** 0.024587*** 
 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Network in the 
recipient firm 
QBt 2.690093*** 2.690847*** 2.690724*** 
 
(0.208) (0.208) (0.208) 
QBt squared -2.741735*** -2.742346*** -2.741847*** 
 
(0.208) (0.208) (0.208) 
DENSBt -0.009633 -0.009736 -0.010092 
 
(0.021) (0.021) (0.021) 
INVBt -0.017001 -0.015714 -0.016300 
 Constant 0.556668*** 0.556669*** 0.556706*** 
 
 
(0.191) (0.191) (0.191) 
 YEAR FE Yes Yes Yes 
 adj. R-sq 0.277 0.277 0.277 
 N 95,788 95,788 95,788 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.10. **p<0.05. *** p<0.01. 
 
 
19 
 
 
4.2 NETWORK CHARACTERISTICS OF THE MOBILE INVENTOR  
In order to investigate Hypotheses 1 and 2, we run ordinary least squares (OLS) pooled 
regressions with year fixed effects; standard errors are clustered by the receiving firm. Non-
standardized co-efficients and standard errors of point estimates are reported in Table 4. 
Column 1 reports the co-efficients of variables specified in Equation 3, Column 2 reports 
the co-efficients of variables specified in Equation 4 and Column 3 reports on the coefficients 
of variables specified in Equation 5. The models are stable in terms of the co-efficients and 
explain around 30% of the variation of the independent variable. 
Getting to our first research question, we assess whether broker inventors or inventors 
with cohesive networks enhance the innovation impact of the receiving firm. To start in 
Column 1 of Table 4, we introduce Cit-3 and look at the effect of mobile inventors on the basis 
of their network constraint prior to the event of mobility. The negative coefficient we find 
means that those inventors who were in broker positions before the event of mobility, 
influence the impact of firm-level innovation more than non-broker inventors. The squared 
term of Cit-3 was not significant, and therefore, the linear regression alone would infer a linear 
relationship between being a broker and innovation. However, we calculated the marginal 
effect of Cit-3 from the regression reported in Column 1 by keeping all other covariates fixed 
and plotted it in Figure 2A. These marginal effects in Figure 3A suggest that the effect of Cit-3 
is not completely linear. In fact, we find that the mobile inventor has the greatest impact on 
the recipient firm if his/her network constraint is 0.22, the marginal effect is significant in 
the optimal point. Despite mobile brokers might induce the impact of innovation at the 
recipient firm more than mobile non-brokers, a certain degree of cohesiveness amplifies the 
effect. In sum, calculating the marginal effects, we find support for Hypotheses 1. 
Figure 2  
Marginal effects of network constraint (C) on citation growth. 
(A) 
 
(B) 
 
Note: (A) Network constraint of the mobile inventor at time t-3. The solid line represents 
estimates and the dashed line is the 95% confidence interval. The dotted vertical line at 
Cit=0.22 denotes the highest predicted margin. (B) Network constraint of the mobile inventor 
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at time t. The solid line represents estimates and the dashed line is the 95% confidence 
interval. The dotted vertical line at Cit=0.61 denotes the highest predicted margin. 
However, the mobile inventor establishes new connections with colleagues at the 
receiving firm while working on new patents, which can alter the value of network constraint. 
This problem is more pronounced in time-weighted networks, such as our co-inventor 
network, because newly established ties are stronger by definition and thus can increase 
constraint. To look at this notion, we introduce the change of Ci between time t and t-3 into 
Columns 2 of Table 4. As expected, the coefficient of Cit - Cit-3 takes the positive sign while the 
sign of Cit-3 does not change. In the final step, we introduce Cit and also its squared term in 
Column 3 of Table 4. Indeed, both of the coefficients are significant but with opposite sign 
and their relation suggest a reverse U-shape. We calculate the marginal effect of Cit from 
Column 3 and depict it in Figure 2B. The finding demonstrates that the reversed U-shape 
curve shifts to the right, and the optimal point becomes Cit =0.61. These results support 
Hypotheses 2, we find that new inventors who provide access to new external knowledge 
through their previous contacts enhance the innovation performance of the firm more if they 
work in cohesive projects in the recipient firm and thus increase their network constraint.  
We control for the interaction between Cit and Dit because those inventors are more likely 
to be brokers who have more connections (Burt, 2004). We indeed find a significant effect of 
the interaction term, which suggest that it is important and makes individual effects clearer. 
We find that Dit has a positive effect on the firm-level outcome, which suggests that the 
connectedness of inventors matter. Further inventor characteristics are controlled for as well, 
PATit has a significant effect but CITit is not significant. Regarding the firm-level control 
variables, we find that the firm receives more citations in the future if the new inventor is 
coming from a firm that has many patent applications and if the receiving firm itself has 
produced many patent applications and has already accumulated many citations. The 
coefficients PATA,t and CITA,t are lower by two orders of magnitude than the coefficients of 
PATB,t and CITB,t and CITA,t.is not significant. This means that the quality of the sending firm 
matter less than the quality of the receiving firm. This is intuitive and one might list various 
reasons that cause it; for example, inter-firm knowledge transfer is not automatic and one 
mobile inventor might transfer only a tiny share of sending firm’s knowledge. More 
interestingly, we do not find a significant correlation between the number of inventors 
working for the receiving company. This might be due to the very high correlation between 
INVBt and Cit and Cit-3 and we will come back to this issue in a bit. 
The co-efficients of T is positive and significant in all the models indicating that treated 
firms cumulate more citations within 10 years after the treatment than non-treated firms. As 
expected, T10 and APP10 have positive and significant point estimates, which means that the 
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more treatment the firm receives and the more patent applications it submits over the 10 
years after the investigated treatment the more citations the firm will receive. 
 
4.3 THE NETWORK ENHANCEMENT EFFECT 
 
The remaining co-efficients in Table 4 are related to the network characteristics of the 
recipient firm. We expected a non-linear correlation between the small-worldliness indicator 
QB,t and citation growth (Uzzi and Spiro, 2005). Indeed, QB,t has a significant positive 
coefficient while its’ squared term has a significant negative coefficient. We calculated the 
marginal effect of QB,t from the regression reported in Column 1 of Table 4 by keeping all 
other covariates fixed and plotted it in Figure 3. One can observe that the margins have an 
almost perfect reversed U-shape. The reversed U-shape means that the impact of innovation 
grows if Q increases from 0 to 0.5 but patents get less citations if Q increases from 0.5 
towards 1 the patents produced by the firm are likely to get less citations. The result suggests 
that medium values of small-worldliness are optimal for innovation and our case resembles 
the example of Uzzi and Spiro (2005). This finding alone supports the idea of the optimal 
structure of inventor collaboration networks because a combination of weak and strong ties is 
needed to better outcomes (Aral, 2016). Those co-inventor networks are more productive 
that contain cohesive groups that can be reached through only few steps because this 
structure enables effective communication. However, the likelihood to find diverse 
information in a network is low if the network is too small-worldly. 
Figure 3  
Marginal effect of the small-worldliness (Q) of inventor collaboration networks 
on citation growth 
 
Note: The solid line represents the point estimates and the dashed lines depict 95% 
confidence interval.  
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The collaboration network of inventors within the receiving firm is an important source of 
knowledge production because the knowledge of the new inventor can be transmitted to 
other projects through connections and also because the new inventor can benefit from 
accessing knowledge of indirect partners. Therefore, we aim to investigate whether cohesive 
or loosely knit co-inventor networks enhance the treatment effect of incoming inventors. 
Here, instead of looking at the accelerator effect of small-worldliness Q, we apply its’ 
components, namely high transitivity (TRBt) and average path length (APLBt) and investigate 
their enhancement effect separately. 
In order to carry out the exercise, we take the number of previously received citations 
CITit as quality indicator of the inventor’s knowledge that might spill over to other colleagues 
in the network. Further, we also consider whether the mobile inventor brings diverse 
knowledge into the firm. To do this, we transform the Cit-3 indicator into 1–Cit-3 that is high if 
the inventor is broker and is low if the inventor is not a broker. This latter transformation will 
make the interpretation of the results easier. Then, we interact these inventor qualities with 
TRBt and APLBt and introduce these variables into Equation 6 along with further control 
variables applied in Section 4.2. We use OLS regression with clustered standard errors by the 
receiving firm for estimation. Table 5 summarizes the results.  
We find that transitivity of the network increases the positive shock that a new high-
impact inventor means for the firm. This is what we would expect because network cohesion 
and strong ties are important for understanding and transferring complex knowledge. We do 
not find that average path length matters for network enhancement. This is surprising 
because short paths could speed up the spreading of new knowledge. 
More importantly, we find that transitivity increases the effect of incoming brokers while 
smaller average path length favours the spillover of their knowledge. These two findings 
together suggest that the small world property of inventor collaboration networks within 
firms enhance the effect of incoming brokers. We verify Hypothesis 3. 
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Table 5  
The enhancement effect of small world networks 
 
Cumulative citations of firms 10 years after the 
treatment 
 (1) (2) (3) 
CITit × TRBt 2.923299*** 
 
4.116214*** 
 
(0.852) 
 
(1.130) 
CITit × APLBt -0.009648 
 
-0.097487 
 
(0.058) 
 
(0.078) 
(1 - Cit-3) × TRBt 
 
0.363337 1.440075** 
  
(0.957) (0.626) 
(1 - Cit-3) × APLBt 
 
-0.107501** -0.157022*** 
  
(0.047) (0.032) 
1 - Cit-3 0.844843*** 1.011258*** 0.980187*** 
 
(0.246) (0.256) (0.242) 
CITit -0.051633** -0.009491 -0.045144** 
 
(0.021) (0.045) (0.021) 
TRBt 0.362160*** -0.001086 -1.077962* 
 
(0.031) (0.957) (0.626) 
APLBt -0.017367*** 0.090112* 0.139651*** 
 
(0.005) (0.047) (0.032) 
Constant -0.338523 -0.504976 -0.473864 
 
(0.325) (0.332) (0.321) 
YEAR FE Yes Yes Yes 
adj. R-sq 0.279 0.279 0.279 
N 95788 95788 95788 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.10. **p<0.05. *** p<0.01. Further control variables 
that are not reported in the table include Dit, Cit × Dit, INVBt, DENSBt, CITBt, PATBt, CITAt, PATAt, PATit, 
APP10, T, T10. Standard errors are clustered by the receiving firm. 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
A quasi-experimental approach has been taken in this paper to assess the role of co-inventor 
networks on firm-level innovation performance and the events of inter-firm mobility of 
inventors were used as sources of external variation.  
We argue that the nodal characteristics of those new inventors who bring new knowledge 
into the firm matter and thus we can better understand if individuals with diverse access to 
external knowledge or those who are located in cohesive groups add more to the innovation 
process. Our first finding suggests that neither extremely high nor extremely low but 
moderately low values of network cohesion are optimal for innovation performance. In other 
words, those inventors make the largest impact who are brokers but have previous experience 
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in working with cohesive groups as well. Further, firm-level outcomes are optimal if the new 
inventors collaborate in cohesive groups within the firm because this makes the exploitation 
of the new knowledge more effective. Finally, we argue that the structure of the collaboration 
network of inventors within the firm scales up the positive shock of knowledge inflow. 
Indeed, we find that small world networks are more efficient in enhancing the effect of 
incoming high-impact inventors and brokers. The effects of new inventors are higher if the 
transitivity of the network is high and if the average path length is low.  
The results fit well to the diversity-bandwidth threshold framework that has been recently 
developed in sociology (Aral and van Alstyne, 2011) because knowledge production is optimal 
when a large variety of information accessed through diverse networks are understood and 
processed in cohesive groups that can foster the communication of complex contents. The 
contributions we make in this paper have high relevancy for innovation management and can 
be applied in two ways. First, firms might be able to increase the impact of their innovation 
output by looking at the position of potential new inventors and selecting that one whose 
network constraint is close to the optimal value. Second, firms can further enhance the 
influence of new inventors by establishing cohesive direct environments for them and quick 
access through indirect ties to further knowledge produced and stored in other projects of the 
company. 
Further research is needed to show how these results hold in other situations because the 
potentials for knowledge transfer through inventor mobility and through co-inventor 
contacts might differ across industries. Furthermore, real communication flows should be 
analyzed to shed more light on how knowledge is created and combined in professional 
networks and to what extent external ties are used by mobile inventors in the recipient firm. 
Last, instead of the quasi-experimental approach, organized experiments will help us better 
understand causal relations between co-inventor networks and innovation performance. 
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Supporting Figure 1  
The number of patent applications, inventors and inventor mobility over the 
period and their country distributions 
  
 
 
 
Countries that are covered in the data: Argentina, 
Austria, Australia, Bahamas, Barbados, Belarus, 
Belgium, Bermuda, Brasilia, Brit-Virgin Islands, 
Canada, Cayman Islands, Chile, China, Croatia, 
Cuba, Cyprus, Czech-Republic, Denmark, Estonia, 
Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, 
Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, India, Israel, Italy, 
Japan, Kuwait, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Luxemburg, 
Malaysia, Malta, Mexico, Monaco, Netherlands, 
Netherlands Antilles, Norway, New-Zealand, 
Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Puerto Rico, Qatar, 
Romania, Russia, Samoa, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, 
Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, South-Korea, 
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, 
United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United 
States, Uruguay, Uzbekistan. 
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Supporting Table 1  
Components of the co-inventor network, 2013 
Inventors 2 3 4 5-10 11-20 21-50 51-100 101- 
# 
Components 27,207 17,768 10,276 14,046 1,701 461 62 40 
Avg. Dit 1 1.957 2.884 4.678 7.138 8.238 8.186 9.001 
Avg. Cit N.A. 1 0.921 0.671 0.495 0.467 0.482 0.491 
 
Despite the growing number of brokers, the co-inventor network contained 71,561 isolated 
components in year 2013. The components of the network are not connected to each other, 
thus the network has a very fragmented structure. The vast majority of the components 
contain only a small number of nodes (Table SI3), 77% of the components have less than five 
nodes. However, there are also a considerable number of large components that account for 
many inventors. It is illustrated in Table SI3 that the inventors in large components have 
more connections on average than in small components. The average value of constraint 
decreases as well as the size of the components grows, which means that brokers might be 
found in large components. However, the value of average constraint does not seem to 
decrease monotonously, the value in the largest components are almost identical to the 
components of 11-20 inventors. 
We visualize the largest components of the co-inventor network in Figure SI3 by using 
distinct color codes for each component. Figure SI3A reveals that these large components 
have similar structures; they contain closely connected groups of inventors that. The largest 
network in Figure SI3B contains relatively small closely connected groups, in which inventors 
have all worked with each other on a patent. These groups are linked by few brokers who 
have worked with at least one inventor in one closely connected group and at least one 
inventor in another closely connected group. The second largest network in Figure SI3C has a 
somewhat different structure. The closely connected groups are large and the networks of 
these groups are full, which means that all of the concerning inventors have worked with each 
other.   
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Supporting Figure 2  
The largest components in the co-inventor network, 2013. 
(A) 
 
(B) 
 
(C) 
 
Note: (A) The components that have more than 100 inventors, 2013. Force Atlas 2 algorithm 
was used. (B) The largest component containing 717 inventors, 2013. Fruchterman-Reingold 
algorithm was used. (C) The second largest component containing 504 inventors, 2013. 
Fruchterman-Reingold algorithm was used. 
